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Abstract To address shortcomings of purely reaction-
time based attentional bias modification (ABM) paradigms,
we developed an ABM task that is controlled by eye-
tracking. This task allows to assess and train both disen-
gagement from negative pictures and maintained attention
to positive pictures. As a proof-of-principle study with an
unselected student sample, this positive training (PT;
N = 44) was compared to a negative training (NT;
N = 42), which reinforced the opposite attentional pattern.
Importantly, training trials were completed only if partic-
ipants performed the correct gaze patterns. Results showed
that higher depression levels were associated with slower
disengagement from negative stimuli at baseline. As
expected, the PT induced longer fixations on positive pic-
tures and faster disengagement from negative pictures. The
NT showed no changes in attentional processes. The
groups did not differ in mood reactivity and recovery from
a stressor. Advantages of using eye-tracking in ABM and
potential applications of the training are discussed.
Keywords Attentional bias modification  Eye-tracking 
Attentional disengagement  Depression  Stress
Introduction
Probably everybody recognizes the situation in which one
simply cannot look away from a horrible movie scene or a
car accident on the highway. Attending to such negative
scenes does not make us happy, obviously, but we often
cannot disengage our attention from it. In fact, from an
evolutionary perspective, it makes sense to not completely
ignore such potentially harmful situations or stimuli, in
order to be able to keep the distance or to avoid them in the
future (Rubenking and Lang 2014).
However, it would become maladaptive if we persis-
tently attended to negative information at the expense of
positive information; a tendency often found in individuals
suffering from depression (Peckham et al. 2010). Beck
(1976) postulated that this tendency can be explained by
negative schemata which guide information processing in
depressed individuals, leading them to selectively attend to
negative, schema-congruent stimuli in their environment.
According to Beck´s depression model (1976, 1987) as well
as other prominent cognitive theories of depression
(Teasdale 1988), such attentional processing biases play a
causal role in the development and maintenance of the
disorder.
Importantly, research suggests that the nature of this
bias is different from the one reported in anxiety disorders
(Gotlib and Joormann 2010). Unlike anxious individuals
who show both an orienting bias towards threat (for
reviews, see Cisler and Koster 2010; Mogg and Bradley
1998), as well as delayed disengagement from threat
(Armstrong and Olatunji 2009; Fox et al. 2002; Schofield
et al. 2012), the depressed do not seem to be more vigilant
for negative stimuli than healthy individuals (Caseras et al.
2007; Sanchez et al. 2013). Instead, the attentional pro-
cessing of negative stimuli in depression seems to be
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specifically characterized by the increased maintenance of
eye-gaze on negative information (for a meta-analysis, see
Armstrong and Olatunji 2012), supposedly reflecting a
difficulty to disengage attention from it, once it has become
the focus of attention (Gotlib and Joormann 2010).
Although a number of eye-tracking studies provide evi-
dence for the prolonged processing of negative information
(see Caseras et al. 2007; Eizenman et al. 2003; Kellough
et al. 2008; Sears et al. 2010), until recently it has remained
speculative whether the maintained eye-gaze on negative
information indeed is due to disengagement difficulties
(Sanchez et al. 2013).
The most direct evidence for this assumption comes
from research by Sanchez et al. (2013). In a novel
engagement-disengagement assessment task employing
eye-tracking, participants had to disengage their attention
from negative pictures in order to attend to neutral pictures.
Compared to healthy controls, depressed individuals took
longer to disengage attention from negative stimuli when
prompted to. Moreover, the depressed group lacked the
positive attentional bias (i.e., longer sustained attention to
positive than to neutral or negative stimuli) typically found
in healthy samples (Armstrong and Olatunji 2012; Ellis
et al. 2010; Kellough et al. 2008; Sears et al. 2010), indi-
cating that processing of both negative and positive infor-
mation is affected in depression.
Besides the disturbed disengagement from negative
cues, depression has also been associated with a lack of
inhibitory control over negative information (De Raedt and
Koster 2010) and with the use of maladaptive emotion
regulation strategies (e.g., rumination). This prevents
individuals from implementing more effective strategies,
such as redirecting attention away from negative stimuli
and towards other, more benign cues, or reappraising
emotion-eliciting situations in a less negative way (Gotlib
and Joormann 2010; Joormann and D’Avanzato 2010).
This in turn may lead to prolonged negative affect in
response to stress. In line with the assumption that diffi-
culties in disengagement are associated with impaired
emotion regulation, Sanchez et al. (2013) showed that it
was specifically impaired disengagement from negative
stimuli which predicted impaired recovery from a stressful
speech task.
Supporting the causal role of an attentional bias in
depression and emotional vulnerability, a range of attention
bias modification (ABM) studies have been conducted.
They provide first evidence that training attention away
from negative information and towards neutral or positive
information decreases depressive mood and cortisol
response to stress in dysphoric individuals (Tsumura et al.
2012) as well as depressive symptoms in dysphoric adults,
adolescents, and remitted depressed individuals (Browning
et al. 2012; Wells and Beevers 2010; Yang et al. 2014).
Most of these studies applied the task most commonly
used to measure and modify attentional bias: the dot-probe
task (MacLeod et al. 2002). In this task, individuals are
exposed to series of consecutively presented pairs of neg-
ative and neutral or positive stimuli (images or words) on a
computer screen. Participants are required to respond to a
target stimulus (i.e., a probe), which always appears in the
location of one of the two stimuli. Shorter reaction times to
probes in the location of negatively valenced stimuli
compared to neutral (or positive) stimuli indicate an
attentional bias towards negative information. In the
training version of the task, the probe occurs in about
85–100 % of the trials in the location of the neutral or
positive stimulus, such that participants learn to attend
towards the relatively positive information and away from
negative information.
Despite early promising findings, an increasing number
of studies failed to successfully modify selective attention
with the dot-probe task and also failed to replicate its
beneficial therapeutic effects (for reviews see, Cristea et al.
2015; Mogoase et al. 2014). A possible reason for the
inconsistent findings might be the low reliability of the dot-
probe task, which is related to the exclusive use of reaction
time data when assessing attentional bias (Brown et al.
2014; Schmukle 2005; Staugaard 2009; Waechter and
Stolz 2015). Another frequently provided explanation is
that during the task, participants may completely ignore the
emotionally valenced stimuli and only initiate their search
for the probe once it is presented (Bradley et al. 2010;
Notebaert et al. 2015), making it difficult to measure a
possibly existing (disengagement) bias. Moreover, it has
been suggested that for a change in bias to occur, it might
be necessary for participants to detect the link between
stimulus valence and probe location (Notebaert et al.
2015). Therefore, variations in the degree to which par-
ticipants really attend to and hence process the stimuli
might also explain the inconsistent training effects. Finally,
it is important to note that the suitability of the dot-probe
task has especially been doubted in the context of depres-
sion, as the task does not seem to allow for thorough
conclusions about what is actually measured and targeted
(Leyman et al. 2007). With longer stimulus durations,
participants may shift their attention back and forth
between the stimuli, leaving undetected which attentional
component the task is tapping into: Heightened vigilance
for negative stimuli or, more relevant for depression,
impaired disengagement from negative stimuli.
These arguments suggest that conventional reaction-
time based ABM paradigms such as the dot-probe task are
not the most optimal procedures for measuring and modi-
fying attentional bias, and particularly not so for depressed
individuals (Mogoas¸e et al. 2014). Researchers in this field
have therefore repetitively stressed the need to further
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refine existing ABM tasks and to develop new theory-dri-
ven approaches for modifying attentional bias (Clarke et al.
2014; Mogoas¸e et al. 2014). In a recent meta-analysis by
Mogoas¸e et al., the authors concluded that such future
ABM procedures should not only aim to reliably modify
selective attention, but that they should also have greater
ecological validity and be more captivating for partici-
pants. Despite the growing acknowledgement of the need
to develop new improved methodologies that go beyond
the conventional dot-probe task, there are not enough
studies on novel ABM paradigms yet (Clarke et al. 2014).
A notable exception is the ‘‘person-identity-matching’’
(PIM) task recently proposed by Notebaert et al. (2015).
This ABM paradigm was designed to modify the atten-
tional bias that is characteristic for anxiety, and it may be a
promising alternative to the conventional dot-probe task.
However, it does not allow to target the attentional disen-
gagement deficit found in depression. Moreover, change in
bias was again assessed with the dot-probe task, and no
reliable alternative for measuring training effects was
presented by Notebaert et al. (2015).
Therefore, the aim of the current study was to address
limitations of previous ABM paradigms and to develop and
evaluate a novel, eye-tracking-based (ET) ABM paradigm
to assess and target the disturbed attentional components
operating in depression. In this proof-of-principle study, an
unselected sample of students completed one of two
training versions. In the positive training (PT), participants
were trained to disengage attention from negative pictures
and shift it towards positive pictures, and to maintain
attention on positive pictures, despite the presence of
negative pictures. In the negative training (NT), the
opposite pattern was trained (i.e., disengagement from
positive pictures and maintained attention on negative
pictures). It should be emphasized that we aimed to
develop a disengagement training because the findings of
Sanchez et al. (2013) suggest that specifically the slowed
disengagement from negative stimuli is associated with
impaired mood regulation. In order to train disengagement
from negative stimuli, it is, however, insufficient to only
include disengagement trials, as this might induce a ten-
dency to disengage attention from all pictures, regardless of
their valence. Because of this, and because of the depres-
sion-specific lack of maintained attention to positive
stimuli, trials were added where attention had to be kept on
positive pictures. Notably, the training was completely
controlled by participants’ eye-movements: Each trial
could only be completed if the attentional pattern corre-
sponding to the training condition was executed. This way,
the pace of the task was perfectly tailored to each indi-
vidual’s task performance. Changes in the two attentional
components were assessed by eye-movement recordings
during a modified free-viewing task.
To confirm the validity of our bias measure, we first
investigated the relation of attentional bias with depressive
symptoms. In line with previous research (Sanchez et al.
2013), we expected that higher baseline levels of depres-
sion would be related to slowed disengagement from
negative stimuli. Given the unselected nature of our sam-
ple, the corresponding analyses should be considered
exploratory, though. Regarding the training, we hypothe-
sized that the PT would induce a positive attentional bias
(i.e., relatively longer fixations on positive than on negative
pictures) whereas the NT would induce a negative atten-
tional bias. Moreover, we expected differential changes in
the disengagement component of attention, namely that the
PT group would become faster in disengaging attention
from negative (towards positive) information, whereas the
NT group would become slower in this process. Previous
research on cognitive bias modification (CBM) procedures
targeting approach-avoidance tendencies shows that train-
ing-induced changes in bias are only found in individuals
being trained to avoid negative stimuli, but not in those
being trained to exclusively approach positive stimuli
(Ferrari et al. 2012). This suggests that CBM trainings with
negative and positive stimuli might work specifically via
increasing the avoidance of negative stimuli. Because of
this and because our training was specifically developed to
modify attentional disengagement, we did not have explicit
expectations about changes in maintained attention.
Finally, to assess a causal link between attentional dis-
engagement and mood recovery from stress, and to allow
for validation of our training, participants completed a
stress task at the end of the experiment. Based on previous
research (Sanchez et al. 2013), we expected the PT group




Seventy-eight female and 17 male students (mean
age = 21.79 (SD = 5.15)) of Radboud University Nijme-
gen, the Netherlands, participated in return for course
credit or a 15 Euro reward. Participants were assigned in a




To assess depression levels, the revised version of Beck’s
Depression Inventory was used (BDI-II, Beck et al. 1996).
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The internal consistency of the BDI was good (a = .85).
Moreover, to be able to control for possible differences
between groups in trait anxiety and affect, two additional
baseline questionnaires were administered. The trait sub-
scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T;
Spielberger 1989) was administered to assess anxiety
proneness, and the Positive and Negative Affect Scale
(PANAS; Watson et al. 1988) was used to measure general
levels of affect. The internal consistencies of these ques-
tionnaires in the current sample were excellent (STAI:
a = .92) and good (PANAS subscales: PA: a = .86; NA:
a = .89). All questionnaires were administered in the
participants’ dominant language (German or Dutch).
Mood Ratings
To measure mood changes throughout the experiment,
participants indicated on six items how they felt at the
moment (0 = not at all to 10 = very much). The items
happy and sad assessed general mood and were analyzed to
investigate whether the training affected mood directly. A
score for general mood was calculated by mirroring scores
on the happy mood item and adding them to scores on the
sad mood item, such that higher scores were indicative of
more negative mood. Stress was measured by the items
content, relaxed, frustrated, and nervous, which were
analyzed to assess mood reactivity and recovery from the
stressor. A stress score was calculated by mirroring scores
on the items content and relaxed and adding those to the
scores on the items frustrated and nervous. Consequently,
higher scores reflected higher levels of stress.
The ET-ABM Task
Stimuli
Recent research by Becker et al. (2016) showed that CBM
trainings with a broad range of stimuli, which are not
restricted to depression-relevant content (e.g., threatening
stimuli), can effectively increase a positive processing bias
and reduce emotional vulnerability in dysphoric students.
Based on these findings, we decided to make use of a
disorder-non-specific stimulus selection. Ninety positive
and 90 negative pictures (14.3 cm 9 10.7 cm) from dif-
ferent categories (e.g., people, animals, objects) were
selected from the Nencki Affective Picture System (NAPS;
Marchewka et al. 2014). Forty-five picture sets were cre-
ated, always containing two positive and two negative
pictures matched on content and absolute value of emo-
tional valence (negative: M = 3.34, SD = 0.44; positive:
M = 3.23, SD = 0.44; t (178) = 0.21, p = .834). Nega-
tive pictures were slightly more arousing than positive
pictures, though (negative: M = 5.92, SD = 0.4; positive:
M = 5.11, SD = 0.46; t (178) = 12.74, p\ .001). The
pictures were arranged in a 2 9 2 grid, separating the
screen into four equally sized quadrants, with the picture
location (upper/lower and left/right part of the grid) being
counterbalanced across trials. The stimuli were displayed
on a black 36.5 cm 9 27.5 cm computer screen (IIyama
Vision Master Pro 450), with 1 cm distance between the
pictures. Participants were seated about 60 cm away from
the screen’s center.
Task Design
The task consisted of pre-assessment, training and post-
assessment. On each trial, a white fixation cross appeared
in the middle of one of the four quadrants of the grid. After
fixation of the cross for 500 ms, it disappeared and a set of
4 pictures appeared. By placing the fixation cross into one
of the quadrants (instead of the screen center) and making
sure that it was indeed fixated, we could reliably manipu-
late which of the 4 pictures was fixated first. The training
contained two different types of trials: negative trials and
positive trials. In the PT, participants had to disengage
attention from negative pictures and shift it to positive
pictures, and to maintain attention on positive pictures. On
negative (PT: disengagement) trials, one of the two nega-
tive pictures replaced the fixation cross and participants
had to look away from it and fixate one of the two positive
pictures for 1000 ms. A fixation time of 1000 ms was
chosen based on prior research, indicating that attentional
bias in depression is only observed at longer stimulus
durations (i.e., [1000 ms; De Raedt and Koster 2010).
Upon a sufficiently long fixation of a positive picture, all
pictures disappeared and a probe (i.e., an arrow pointing
left or right, with the direction being counterbalanced
across picture valence) replaced the previously fixated
positive picture. Participants had to react to the arrow’s
direction by pressing a computer key. The probe then
disappeared and a new trial started. On positive (PT:
maintained attention) trials, a positive picture replaced the
fixation cross and the trial continued only if participants
kept looking at this picture for 1000 ms, or if they fixated
the other positive picture for 1000 ms. In the NT, the
opposite pattern was trained: When a positive picture
replaced the fixation cross (positive trial), participants had
to look away from it and fixate a negative picture. When a
negative picture replaced the fixation cross (negative trial),
participants had to keep looking at this picture or fixate the
other negative picture. Importantly, in both the PT and the
NT, the participants’ gaze pattern controlled the appear-
ance of the probe: As soon as a positive (PT) versus neg-
ative (NT) picture was fixated for 1000 ms, the probe
replaced the fixated picture. However, participants were
not told that their viewing patterns would influence the
Cogn Ther Res (2016) 40:672–686 675
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continuation of trials or the location of the arrows. The
training contained 270 training trials distributed across 3
blocks, during which each of the 45 picture sets was pre-
sented 6 times, in a new random order for each participant.
The pre- and post-assessment was introduced as a cali-
bration procedure, and consisted of a free-viewing task
similar to the training. However, independently of partici-
pants’ viewing patterns, all picture sets were presented for
3000 ms and no probe followed. During each assessment,
the 45 picture sets were presented twice (90 trials), once as
positive (PT: maintained attention) and once as negative
(PT: disengagement) trials. During pre- and post-assess-
ment, the location of the fixation cross was counterbalanced
across valences and grid positions. The whole task took
approximately 30 min. Figure 1 illustrates the task design.
Eye-Tracking Device
Monocular gaze data of the dominant eye were obtained at
a frequency of 500 Hz, by means of the iView 9 Hi Speed
system from SMI, a video based eye-tracking system.
Calculation of Attentional Indices
Fixation data recorded during the assessments were used to
calculate the fixation time as an index of attentional pro-
cessing. In accordance with Sanchez et al. (2013), only
measurements where participants fixated a picture for at
least 100 ms were considered. This index was used to
calculate first, a ‘‘sustained attention bias’’ score, reflecting
the proportion of total fixation time on positive compared
to negative pictures, and second, the two attentional com-
ponents relevant here: disengagement from negative pic-
tures (short: negative disengagement) and maintained
attention for positive pictures (short: positive maintained
attention), separately for pre- and post-assessment.
For the sustained attention bias score, two sum scores
were calculated for each trial, reflecting the total time
participants fixated positive and negative pictures. Based
on these scores, medians were calculated, representing the
median time participants fixated positive and negative
pictures.1 The bias score was then calculated as follows:
(Median fixation time on positive pictures)/(median fixa-
tion time on positive pictures ? median fixation time on
negative pictures). Scores larger than 0.5 reflect a more
positive sustained attention bias (relatively longer fixations
on positive pictures), while scores smaller than 0.5 reflect a
more negative sustained attention bias.
For the two attentional components, a median score was
calculated for each trial type, representing the latency of
the attentional shift from the first fixated picture to a pic-
ture of the opposite valence (until its fixation). On negative
trials, shorter latencies of first shifts to positive pictures
reflect faster negative disengagement. On positive trials,
longer latencies of first shifts to negative pictures reflect
longer positive maintained attention.
Stress Task
The task was adapted from Amir et al. (2008). Via the
computer, participants were informed that they would get
1 min to prepare a 3-min-speech on the topic ‘‘nuclear
power’’, which would be video-recorded for later evalua-
tion by two independent researchers. Participants were not
allowed to take notes during preparation and a clock on the
computer screen signaled the time left. After 1 min, a
‘‘beep’’ sound occurred. The experimenter entered the
room, started the video-recording, asked participants to
deliver their speech into a webcam, and left. After 3 min,
the experimenter entered and stopped the video recording.
Thereafter, participants rested for 5 min.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were ran-
domly assigned to the PT or NT, and they completed the
baseline questionnaires and mood measures (i.e., Likert
scales; T0: before pre-assessment). Afterwards, they were
seated in front of the eye-tracker. After determining par-
ticipants dominant eye and running a brief calibration
procedure, the assessment took place, followed by the
training and another mood measure (T1: after training).
Thereafter, the post-assessment followed. The calibration
of the eye-tracker was repeated before each training block
and before the post-assessment. After the post-assessment,
participants completed the mood measures again (T2:
before stress), and they took the stress task. Mood scales
were again administered after providing the speech
instructions (T3: anticipatory stress), as well as after speech
delivery (T4: after stress) and the 5-min resting period (T5:
recovery). To restore positive mood, a brief happy movie
clip (Jungle book) was shown, followed by a final mood
measure. Thereafter, participants filled in an awareness
check, they were paid or received course credits, and they
could leave behind their e-mail address for later debriefing.
The experiment took about 90 min.
Statistical Analysis Plan
To investigate group differences in attentional processes at
baseline, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed
1 As the raw gaze latencies used to calculate the three attentional
indices were not normally distributed, median scores were calculated
rather than mean scores, in order to reduce the impact of skewness
and extreme values in the raw data.
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on the sustained attention bias scores, as well as a multi-
variate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the two
attentional components, negative disengagement and pos-
itive maintained attention. Moreover, Cronbach’s alpha
and Spearman-Brown reliability coefficients were calcu-
lated separately for the three eye-tracking indices at base-
line, to examine the reliability of our novel ET-ABM task.
To explore whether baseline depression levels would be
related to late disengagement from negative information,
exploratory correlations were computed between BDI
scores and the attentional component variable, negative
disengagement. Although we had no explicit expectation
regarding the association of baseline depression levels with
the second attentional component, positive maintained
attention, we explored this correlation as well.
For the evaluation of training effects on attentional
processes, first a 2 (group: PT, NT) 9 2 (time: pre-training,
post-training) repeated-measures (RM) ANOVA was con-
ducted on the sustained attention bias scores. Second, for
the effects on the two attentional components, a 2 (group:
PT, NT) 9 2 (time: pre-training, post-training) 9 2 (trial
type: negative trial, positive trial) RM ANOVA was per-
formed. To additionally explore whether initial tendencies
in attentional processes were related to the training effects,
dependent on training group, two stepwise regression
models were tested. In the first model, baseline sustained
attention bias, group, and the interaction of the two factors
were entered into the regression model to predict change
scores of sustained attention bias (i.e., post-scores minus
pre-scores). In the second model, disengagement from
negative pictures at baseline, group, and the interaction of
these factors were entered to predict changes in negative
disengagement (i.e., post-scores minus pre-scores).
Finally, training effects on mood were investigated in
two steps. To test whether the training directly affected
general (i.e., happy and sad) mood, a 2 (group: PT,
NT) 9 2 (time: pre-training, post-training) RM ANOVA
was conducted. Then, a similar analysis was conducted
with scores on the stress scales (i.e., content, relaxed,
frustrated and nervous) at the four time points during the
speech task (before stress, anticipatory stress, after stress,
recovery), to investigate whether the training affected
mood reactivity and recovery from the stressor.
Results
Preliminary Analyses and Group Characteristics
Four participants were excluded because, due to technical
problems with the eye-tracker, they completed \75 %
training trials. Five additional participants were excluded
due to extreme responses on the baseline questionnaires or
outlying data on the eye-movement indices (i.e., data
points more than 1.5 interquartile ranges below the first or
above the third quartile). Due to skewness of the data, the
BDI scores as well as two attentional variables (negative
disengagement and positive maintained attention) were
log-transformed. In all following analyses, Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections were applied when the assumption of
sphericity was violated.
The groups (PT: N = 44; NT: N = 42) did not differ
significantly on the demographic variables or baseline trait
characteristics (see Table 1).
Attentional Processes at Baseline
Sustained Attention Bias
A one-way ANOVA revealed that the groups did not differ
from each other on their sustained attention bias at base-
line, F(1,84) = 2.24, p = .138. For means, see Table 1. A
subsequent one-sample t test showed that, across groups,
the pre-existing bias score (M = 0.5, SD = 0.05) did not
differ significantly from 0.5 (t(85) = 0.56, p = .58), indi-
cating that there was no sustained attention bias, neither for
positive nor for negative pictures.
Negative Disengagement and Positive Maintained
Attention
A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) of the two
log-transformed attentional variables revealed that the
groups did not differ from each other in negative disen-
gagement or positive maintained attention, F(2, 83) =
0.06, p = .946. An additional paired-samples t test,
bFig. 1 Schematic overview of the task design. On each trial of the
Positive Training (PT), a fixation cross is presented. Upon fixation
(500 ms), two negative and two positive pictures appear. a On
negative (PT: disengagement) trials, participants have to disengage
their attention from the fixated negative picture and fixate one of the
two positive pictures. b On positive (PT: maintained attention) trials,
attention has to be maintained at the fixated positive picture or at the
other positive picture. a, b Upon fixation of a positive picture for
1000 ms, all pictures disappear and an arrow replaces the fixated
picture. Participants respond to arrow direction by pressing a key. The
arrow then disappears and a new trial starts. During the Negative
Training (NT) not shown here, exactly the opposite attentional
patterns are reinforced. c The free viewing task (assessment) is similar
to the training, however, all trials last 3000 ms and no probe is
presented. Note. This figure contains sample images, which have not
been used in the current study. All images were obtained from Flickr
and were published under a Creative Commons license. The formats
of the images were slightly adapted for this figure. Credits: top left,
Joe deSousa, CC0 1.0; top right, West Point—The U.S. Military
Academy, CC BY 2.0; bottom left, Steven Depolo, CC BY 2.0;
bottom right, bettyx1138, CC BY 2.0. For license terms see, CC0 1.0
(https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/); CC BY 2.0
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/)
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comparing the two attentional indices across groups,
showed that participants took longer to disengage attention
from negative pictures (M = 638, SD = 195) than from
positive pictures (M = 575, SD = 159), t(85) = 4.32,
p\ .001. For means, see Table 2.
Reliability of the Attentional Process Measures
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated separately for all three
eye-tracking indices at baseline. Trials with a large number
of missing data ([10 %) were excluded (i.e., sustained
attention bias: 2; negative disengagement: 8; positive
maintained attention: 5). The resulting Cronbach’s alpha
values for the three eye-tracking variables were good
(sustained attention bias: a = .88; negative disengagement:
a = .81; positive maintained attention: a = .79). Spear-
man-Brown reliability coefficients for the three indices
were somewhat lower with .78 (sustained attention bias),
.73 (negative disengagement), and .65 (positive maintained
attention), but can still be considered acceptable.
Table 1 Group differences on
demographic variablesa and
Baseline Questionnaires
PT (N = 44) NT (N = 42)
Age 21.45 (3.55) 22.44 (6.81) t(83) = 0.84, p = .401
Gender ,2(1) = 0.85, p = .358
Male 7 10
Female 37 32
Nationality ,2(2) = 2.35, p = .309
Dutch 28 30
German 16 10
Education ,2(3) = 0.84, p = .84
Psychology 24 19
Educational science 3 3
Other 16 17
No study 1 2
Year of education 2.09 (1.39) 1.73 (1.47) t(83) = 1.16, p = .25
BDI 5.93 (5.8) 5.29 (4.17) t(84) = 0.59, p = .556
STAI-T 38.36 (9.96) 37.52 (10.07) t(84) = 0.39, p = .698
NA 17.11 (6.67) 17.17 (6) t(84) = 0.04, p = .969
PA 31.86 (6.33) 30.45 (5.76) t(84) = 1.08, p = .284
Mood baseline 18.52 (7.22) 20.12 (7.07) t(84) = 1.07, p = .289
PT positive training; NT negative training; BDI revised becks depression inventory (BDI-II); STAI-T
Spielberger trait anxiety inventory; PA positive affect; NA negative affect
a Demographic information of two participants in the NT group was missing
Table 2 Mean fixation times
(with standard deviations) in
milliseconds during the free
viewing task, and the resulting
attentional bias scores
PT NT
Pre-training Post-training Pre-training Post-training








































PT positive training; NT negative training; Sustained attention bias score: Proportion of total fixation time
on positive pictures compared to negative pictures; Disengagement from negative pictures: Latency of the
first shift from a negative picture until fixation of a positive picture; Maintained attention for positive
pictures: Latency of the first shift from a positive picture until fixation of a negative picture
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Relation Between Negative Disengagement
and Depression
The correlational analysis revealed the expected significant
correlation between BDI and negative disengagement
latencies, r(86) = .23, p = .036, supporting that higher
levels of depression were associated with slower disen-
gagement from negative stimuli. By contrast, there was no
evidence for a relation between depression levels and
positive maintained attention (r(86) = .17, p = .126).
Given the strong correlation between depression levels and
anxiety levels in our sample, r(86) = .72, p\ .001, we
additionally explored the correlation between BDI and
negative disengagement, while controlling for STAI scores.
The correlation between BDI and negative disengagement
became non-significant (p = .514). Likewise, the correla-
tion between STAI scores and negative disengagement was
non-significant when controlling for depression scores
(p[ .197).2
Training Effects on Attentional Processes
Changes in Sustained Attention Bias
The 2 (group: PT, NT) 9 2 (time: pre-training, post-
training) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed significant
main effects of time, F(1, 84) = 32.58, p\ .001, g2 = .28,
and of group, F(1, 84) = 34.46, p\ .001, g2 = .29, which
were subsumed under a significant time-by-group interac-
tion, F(1, 84) = 31.24, p\ .001, g2 = .27. In line with the
training contingency, the PT group showed an increase in
positive sustained attention bias, t(43) = 8.16; p\ .001,
whereas no change was found in the NT group,
t(41) = 0.08; p = .935). An independent samples t test
showed that the PT group had a more positive sustained
attention bias after the training than the NT (t(84) = 6.24,
p\ .001). One-sample t tests revealed the presence of a
positive bias in the PT group after the training, that is,
relatively longer fixations on positive than on negative
pictures, t(43) = 8.28, p\ .001, while no bias was present
in the NT group, t(41) = 0.23, p = .823. For means, see
Table 2.
Changes in Negative Disengagement and Positive
Maintained Attention
To assess training effects on the two attentional compo-
nents separately, a 2 (group: PT, NT) 9 2 (time: pre-
training, post-training) 9 2 (trial type: negative trial, pos-
itive trial) RM ANOVA was conducted. This analysis
revealed significant main effects of trial type, F(1,
84) = 11.23, p = .001, g2 = .12, as well as significant
interactions for group-by-trial type, F(1, 84) = 10.62,
p = .002, g2 = .11, and time-by-trial type, F(1,
84) = 7.11, p = .009, g2 = .08. Importantly, the analysis
also revealed a significant three-way interaction of group-
by-time-by-valence, F(1, 84) = 10.83, p = .001, g2 = .11,
indicating that the two groups showed differential changes
in negative disengagement and positive maintained atten-
tion. No other main effects or two-way interactions were
significant (all p[ .17). Subsequent paired samples t tests
revealed that the training effects were driven by a signifi-
cant decrease in disengagement latencies from negative
pictures in the PT group, t(43) = 4.39, p\ .001. Thus, the
PT group became faster to look away from negative pic-
tures and towards positive pictures. No other comparisons
were significant, showing that the training did not change
maintained attention for positive pictures in the PT group,
t(43) = 0.9, p = .372, nor did attentional components
change in the NT group (negative disengagement:
t(41) = 0.85, p = .401; positive maintained attention:
t(41) = 0.46, p = .646). Independent samples t tests
showed that after the training, the PT group was faster to
disengage from negative pictures than the NT group
(t(84) = 2.9, p = .005), while the groups did not differ in
their maintained attention on positive pictures (t(84) = 0.6,
p = .949). Whereas the sample was initially faster to dis-
engage attention from positive than from negative pictures,
after training, this was still the case only after NT
(t(41) = 3.49, p = .001). The pattern in the PT group
reversed into relatively faster disengagement from negative
pictures (t(43) = 2.99, p = .005).
Prediction of Training Effects
The first regression model was conducted to predict train-
ing-induced changes in sustained attention bias. The model
was significant, F(2,83) = 18.26, p\ .001; R2 = .31,
indicating that lower initial bias scores were related to a
larger increase in bias in response to the training,
b = -.188, p = .046. Moreover, the increase in positive
sustained attention bias was higher after PT than after NT,
b = .551, p\ .001.
The second regression model was conducted to predict
training-induced changes in disengagement from negative
stimuli. It was significant as well, F(2,83) = 9.28,
2 Given the unselected nature of our sample, we additionally
explored the correlations between the two log-transformed attentional
component variables and the other trait questionnaires (STAI and
PANAS). While the correlations with PANAS were not significant
(p[ .133), anxiety ratings were positively related to maintained
attention to positive stimuli, r(86) = .22, p = .046, as well as to
disengagement from negative stimuli, r(86) = .25, p = .021, indi-
cating that the more anxious participants were, the longer they took to
disengage attention from the picture they had fixated first, irrespective
of the picture’s valence.
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p\ .001; R2 = .18. As in the first model, slower disen-
gagement from negative pictures at baseline was related to
a stronger decrease in disengagement latencies in response
to the training, b = -.3, p = .003. This effect was mod-
erated by training, indicating that participants with longer
disengagement latencies from negative pictures at baseline
in the PT group showed a stronger decrease in these dis-
engagement latencies, compared to participants in the NT,
b = -.306, p\ .001.
Training Effects on Mood
Direct Effects on General Mood
To investigate whether the training directly affected par-
ticipants´ mood, data of those participants who completed
the general mood scales after the training (PT: n = 31, NT:
n = 36) were analyzed.3 The mood data were subjected to
a 2 (group: PT, NT) 9 2 (time: T0 pre-training, T1 post-
training) RM ANOVA, which revealed a significant time
effect, F(1, 65) = 21.71, p\ .001, g2 = .25, which was
modulated by a significant time-by-group interaction, F(1,
65) = 5.78, p = .019, g2 = .08. Subsequent independent
samples t tests revealed that the groups did not differ in
general mood before the training (T0; PT: M = 5.97; NT:
M = 6.39; t(65) = 0.38, p = .706) but that the NT group
showed a more negative mood than the PT group after the
training (T1; PT: M = 6.68; NT: M = 8.61; t(65) = 2.6,
p = .012). Means and standard deviations are presented in
Table 3.
Effects on Mood Reactivity and Recovery in Response
to Stress
To investigate whether the training affected participants´
stress responses, data of those participants who completed
the stress scales after the training were analyzed (PT:
n = 44, NT: n = 39). The groups did not differ in stress
levels directly before the stress task, t(81) = 0.74,
p = .417. To test whether the training affected mood
responses to stress, a 2 (group: PT, NT) 9 4 (time: T2
before stress, T3 anticipatory stress, T4 after stress, T5
recovery) RM ANOVA was conducted on the stress scores.
The main effect of time was significant, F(2.26,
182.96) = 34.81, p\ .001, g2 = .3. Inspection of the
means showed that the stress task had its intended effects:
stress ratings increased upon announcement of the task (T2
before stress: M = 14.58, T3 anticipatory stress:
M = 21.22), and decreased afterwards (T4 after stress:
M = 19.36, T5 recovery: M = 17.31). However, the
crucial group-by-time interaction was not significant,
F(2.26, 182.96) = 0.22, p = .828, indicating that the
groups did not differentially react to or recover from the
stressor.4 All means and standard deviations are presented
in Table 3.
Exploratory Analyses of Awareness of Training
Contingency
The two groups did not differ in their awareness of the
training contingencies (aware of contingency PT: n = 9,
NT: n = 13, ,2(86) = 1.24, p = .265). Additional
exploratory analyses were conducted to investigate whe-
ther the training effects reported above depended on par-
ticipants’ awareness of the training contingencies. For this
purpose, the factor contingency awareness was added to all
analyses, revealing that it was unrelated to the training
effects. This was observed for the sustained attention bias
score, F(1, 82) = 1.14, p = .288, and for the training
effects on the two separate attentional components, F(1,
82) = 2.33, p = .131. Moreover, training effects on gen-
eral mood directly after the training did not depend on
contingency awareness either (general mood: F(1,
63) = 0.14, p = .708). The same was true for effects on
mood reactivity and recovery in response to the stressor
(stress: F(2.3, 181.57) = 0.21, p = .84).
Discussion
This study investigated a novel ABM paradigm based on
eye-tracking, designed to assess and target the attentional
components that are disturbed in depression: disengage-
ment from negative stimuli and maintained attention to
positive stimuli. Eye-tracking was used to measure atten-
tional changes and, more importantly, for training pur-
poses: Only correct eye-movements were reinforced, such
that participants could only complete the training trials if
they showed the required attentional viewing patterns.
First of all, we replicated earlier research (e.g., Sanchez
et al. 2013), showing that higher levels of depression were
specifically associated with slower disengagement from
3 Due to technical and experimenter errors, data from only 67
participants were available for this analysis.
4 As Sanchez et al. (2013) found that difficulties in disengagement
specifically predicted lower recovery from sad mood after stress, we
conducted additional exploratory MANOVAs, with the change scores
of all six mood items as dependent variables, for the different phases
of the experiment. A MANOVA on the six mood change-scores from
before (T0) to after the training (T1), revealed no significant effect of
group, F(6, 60) = 1.63, p = .156. A MANOVA on mood changes in
response to the speech task (mood reactivity: T2–T3) revealed no
significant group effect either, F(6, 76) = 1.23, p = .3. Also, a
MANOVA on change scores of all mood items, from announcement
of the speech task (T3) to after the recovery phase (T5; mood
recovery) was not significant, F(6, 76) = 0.31, p = .93.
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negative information, confirming the validity of our mea-
surement. Next and more importantly, our results showed
that the training successfully modified selective attention,
with the PT inducing a positive bias. No such change was
found in the NT. Notably, these general training effects
were driven specifically by faster disengagement from
negative pictures in the PT group, indicating that our
training directly taps into the attentional processes that are
disturbed in depression. Although the PT functioned to
induce relatively longer fixations of positive than negative
pictures, the training did not modify the initial maintained
attention for positive pictures. Again, no changes were
found in the NT group, suggesting that the training did not
induce dysfunctional attentional processes in our unse-
lected sample.
The finding that the PT worked specifically by training
disengagement from negative pictures is consistent with
earlier research (Ferrari et al. 2012), supporting the rele-
vance of targeting the processing of negative stimuli in
modifying cognitive biases. A possible explanation for why
the training did not increase initial maintained attention for
positive pictures might be the perceptual salience of neg-
ative stimuli (Rozin and Royzman 2001). On positive tri-
als, the tendency to first quickly scan the remaining
pictures of the display might have overruled the tendency
to sustain attention on the already fixated positive picture.
Although this remains speculative, of course, future
research using this ABM training should take the deter-
mining role of the negative stimuli into account and
investigate whether training with exclusively negative
disengagement trials is equally or even more effective than
training with both types of trial. An alternative explanation
for the absence of training effects on maintained attention
might be related to our temporal criteria that defined a
fixation during training. In order to continue with a training
trial, participants in the PT had to fixate a positive picture
for 1000 ms. In fact, these 1000 ms might not be sufficient
for promoting ‘‘longer’’ maintained attention for positive
stimuli. Instead, we might have trained short maintained
attention to positive stimuli. Our main goal was to modify
attentional disengagement with this training paradigm,
which is also a reason for why we had no specific
hypothesis about changes in maintained attention. In future
research, the maintained attention component might be
more optimally addressed by increasing the required fixa-
tion duration on positive pictures.
Regarding the above-mentioned findings, it is important
to note that before training, our sample did not show the
positive attentional bias which is supposed to be typical for
healthy individuals. Instead, we observed equally long
fixations of positive and negative pictures. More surpris-
ingly, our sample even exhibited a tendency to disengage
attention from negative pictures more slowly than from
positive pictures (i.e., a disengagement bias), which con-
tradicts a large number of studies providing evidence for a
positive bias in unselected samples (e.g., Ellis et al. 2010;
Kellough et al. 2008; Sears et al. 2010). A possible
explanation for this unexpected finding might be related to
the differences in arousal levels of positive and negative
pictures used in the ET-ABM task. Positive stimuli are
usually rated as less arousing than negative stimuli, inde-
pendent of their emotional valence or pleasantness (see for
instance, Lang et al. 2005). Although we matched the
pictures on valence intensity, this was also the case with
our selected set of pictures. Importantly, research has
shown that attentional disengagement is slower from
highly arousing stimuli than from stimuli low in arousal,
independent of stimulus valence (Vogt et al. 2008). The
difference in arousal levels thus might be the reason for
why even our healthy sample showed longer initial fixa-
tions on negative than on positive pictures. At the same
time, this pre-existing negative bias might explain why we
were not able to further increase dysfunctional attentional
patterns with the NT. The finding however, that the ET-
ABM could not only induce a general positive bias, but
even reverse the pre-existing disengagement bias in the PT
group, has important implications for its potential clinical
application. Together with the finding that initial














General mood 5.97 (2.82) 6.68 (2.79) 7.7 (3.2) 8.11 (3.04) 8.7 (2.43) 8.5 (1.95)
Stress 11.61 (4.65) 12.94 (5.05) 14.09 (6.31) 20.82 (7.12) 19.18 (7.93) 17.3 (6.51)
NT
General mood 6.39 (2.75) 8.61 (3.24) 8.1 (2.64) 8.33 (3.33) 8.08 (2.54) 8.25 (2.18)
Stress 14 (5.17) 15.44 (5.32) 15.13 (5.11) 21.67 (6.86) 19.56 (7.11) 17.33 (6.42)
PT positive training; NT negative training; general mood (items: happy, sad); stress (items: content, relaxed, frustrated, and nervous)
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disengagement from negative stimuli predicted greater
changes in this attentional component, these results suggest
that particularly depressed individuals might benefit from
this new ET-ABM.
The successful modification of attentional processes
further allowed us to investigate mood changes. Although
negative mood increased in both groups throughout the
training (possibly due to monotonicity of the procedure),
this increase was stronger in the NT group. Earlier
research, which failed to find immediate training effects on
mood state, concluded that ABM procedures may only
serve to affect the way in which people respond to subse-
quent situations requiring the processing of emotional
information (e.g., MacLeod et al. 2002). Our results sug-
gest that mood can be directly altered as a function of
training contingencies with, in our case, a more negative
mood resulting from reinforcing dysfunctional attentional
patterns. This discrepancy might be related to the fact that
the NT group needed to actually attend to, and hence
process, the negative stimuli in order to complete our task.
By contrast, in the dot-probe task, it might be enough to
peripherally process the picture’s valence. Hence, differ-
ences between the groups in the depth of processing of the
negative stimuli might explain why we found differential
changes in mood.
Despite the direct effects on general mood, the training
did not differentially affect mood changes in response to
the stressor. The PT group did not show more attenuated
stress levels or recovered more quickly from the stressor
than the NT group, as suggested by Sanchez et al. (2013) or
by Tsumura et al. (2012). It is important to note, though,
that our sample did not include clinically or sub-clinically
depressed individuals, therefore the sample should be less
affected by stressful situations, and hence less susceptible
to a CBM-induced stress reduction. While some studies did
find stress-attenuating effects in healthy samples (e.g.,
MacLeod et al. 2002), other research suggests that such
favorable effects are restricted to emotionally vulnerable
individuals (Becker et al. 2016). Although our study does
not support the causal role of negative attentional bias, and
specifically slowed disengagement from negative stimuli in
mood reactivity and recovery from stress, we suggest that
future research should apply this training to a sub-clinically
depressed sample, before drawing firm conclusions about
its therapeutic value.
In a recent paper reflecting on the increasing number of
reported ABM failures, Clarke et al. (2014) stated that it is
highly unlikely that the first ABM task ever developed (i.e.,
the dot-probe task) will turn out to be the most successful
one in modifying selective attention. It appears even more
unlikely that this task, which has primarily been developed
to affect anxiety vulnerability (MacLeod et al. 2002), will
be equally effective for depression, considering the
different nature of the bias in this disorder (Gotlib and
Joormann 2010). The few studies, which sought to modify
attentional bias in depression have mainly tailored the dot-
probe task to depressed samples by using longer stimulus
presentation times. However, the different attentional
components of maintained attention and disengagement of
attention cannot be targeted and assessed unambiguously
with this procedure (Mogoas¸e et al. 2014).
We assume that the strong training effects on attention
found in our study are related to methodological advan-
tages of the ET-ABM paradigm over conventional reac-
tion-time based ABM tasks. The ET-ABM combines both
trials starting with the fixation of a negative picture and
trials starting with the fixation of a positive picture with the
continuous measurement of eye movements. This allows
for a more reliable measurement of attention and, more
importantly, for a separate assessment of disengagement
from negative stimuli and maintained attention on positive
stimuli. Because the eye-tracker allows for targeted rein-
forcement of these specific gaze patterns, we can be sure
that the use of alternative, undesired search strategies is
discouraged and that the pace of the task is tailored to
participants’ individual learning speed. The latter may be
of particular importance when the training is applied in
cognitively impaired, depressed samples. Furthermore, our
paradigm addresses the demand for novel ABM tasks that
have greater ecological validity and are more engaging
(Mogoas¸e et al. 2014). Contrary to the dot-probe task, the
ET-ABM contains more than two visual stimuli per trial,
increasing the requirement of redirecting attention away
from negative stimuli and towards positive stimuli. Also,
we made use of an unspecific and diverse selection of
stimuli, representative of stimuli encountered in everyday
life, rather than only pictures of faces, for instance. Finally,
controlling the task by eye-movements might increase the
game-like character of the procedure and have beneficial
effects on its acceptability, which is crucial when we aim to
provide the training to individuals with low motivation.
Future research should investigate whether this ET-ABM
task is indeed more acceptable than conventional ABM
paradigms, and whether it results in fewer drop-outs when
providing more training sessions.
Despite these promising findings, several limitations
have to be noted. As a proof-of-principle study, we con-
ducted the experiment in an unselected student sample.
Although our sample was characterized by a disengage-
ment bias, the results cannot be generalized to a depressed
population. In fact, average baseline depression levels were
very low (M = 5.62, SD = 5.05), ranging from 0 to 28,
with only 3 participants scoring above 13 (mild to mod-
erate depressive characteristics). Considering that BDI
scores lower than 14 reflect minimal levels of depression
(Beck et al. 1996), this suggests that our sample
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represented a rather healthy control group instead of an
unselected group. This limited variance in depression
levels might have obscured meaningful relations between
depression scores and measures of attentional processes. It
also questions the interpretability of our findings regarding
the association of heightened depression levels with slower
disengagement from negative stimuli at baseline. Analyses
involving BDI scores must therefore be interpreted with
caution, as findings cannot easily be generalized to higher
or even psychopathological levels of depression. The
interpretability of the above-mentioned association is
complicated even more by the high correlation of depres-
sion and anxiety levels in our sample, and by the fact that
the association disappeared when anxiety was taken into
account. Although this suggests that heightened levels of
psychopathological traits are related to difficulties in dis-
engaging attention from negative stimuli, we cannot iden-
tify the unique role of depression in this relationship.
Second, the lack of a proper sham-training control group
limits the interpretation of our findings. Future research
needs to compare the PT to a placebo training condition in
order to test its beneficial effects on attentional processes.
Third, the use of an identical picture set in both training
and assessment does not allow for any conclusions
regarding the transfer of training effects to other stimuli. It
is also possible that we in fact did not change the atten-
tional processing of negative and positive stimuli in gen-
eral, but that the observed effects are restricted to the
specific stimuli we used during training. Fourth, to further
validate our training and to test its potential superiority
over existing ABM tasks, such as the dot-probe task,
research should directly compare the two paradigms.
Moreover, employing an eye-tracker in the ET-ABM is
obviously more expensive and more difficult than simply
using a standard PC in conventional ABM tasks. Therefore,
the cost-effectiveness of the ET-ABM needs to be deter-
mined and compared to simpler ABM tasks. Finally, as we
assessed attentional processes only directly after training, it
remains unclear how long the effects of a single training
session will last. Especially for clinical improvement, an
enduring change in attentional processes is crucial. We
therefore recommend that future research should include
multiple training sessions and long-term follow-up mea-
sures, to provide insight into the temporal stability of the
modified attentional processes.
To conclude, this is one of the first studies that devel-
oped and tested a novel ABM task, targeted at the atten-
tional processes which are biased in depression. A single
session of this new ET-ABM could induce a sustained
attention bias for positive information and increase disen-
gagement from negative stimuli. Although we could not
find evidence for effects of the training on stress responses,
the association of slowed disengagement with higher
depression levels at baseline suggests that repeated training
sessions with this task might have therapeutic relevance.
Considering the rather healthy status of our sample and the
strong correlation with anxiety levels, which might also
explain the above-mentioned relationship, this interpreta-
tion certainly has to be treated with caution. Future
research is needed to confirm this preliminary finding, by
replicating this study in a sample with elevated or sub-
clinical levels of depression. With more research into novel
ABM paradigms, we hope to get closer to finding the most
effective way of producing enduring changes in attentional
processes underlying depression.
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